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Abstract
It is widely accepted that if a property is essential then it is
necessary. Against this I present numerous counterexamples
from biology and chemistry, which fall into two groups: (I) A
property is essential to a genus or species, yet some instances of
this genus or species do not have this essential property. (II) A
property is essential to a genus, yet some species of this genus
do not have this essential property. I discuss and reject four
minor objections. Then I discuss in depth whether a distinction
between constitutive essence and consequential essence is able to
handle these counterexamples. I conclude that this distinction
is better put as one between (1) the essence, which is necessary,
and (2) the essential properties, which are not formally necessary.
An essence of an object X is the substantial universal expressed
by its real definition. An object X has a property P essentially
iff the property P is explanatory and non-trivial, and P follows
from the essence of X.
Keywords: essential properties, necessary properties, essence,
exceptions
Kripke, Putnam, and others defended the tenability of essentiality as de
re necessity, orthodoxly analysed as something that is true of a thing
in all possible worlds where it exists (cf. [27] for a historical survey).
According to this modal view, a property is predicated essentially if
and only if it is (physically) necessary. If an object X essentially has a
property P, then it must have P in all possible worlds where X exists (i.e.
it must be necessary). Consequently, by losing the property P the object
X would cease to exist. On the other hand, an essential property is often
held to be explanatory (and as giving a definition and an account).
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However, using the example of Socrates and the singleton set
{Socrates}, Kit Fine [8], [9] has argued that this does not square with
the necessity view: while necessity holds in both directions (if Socrates
exists then {Socrates} exists, and also if {Socrates} exists then Socrates
exists), explanation only holds in one direction. It is not explanatory for
Socrates to say that he is the sole member of {Socrates}. However, it
is explanatory for {Socrates} to say that it contains Socrates as the sole
member.
Two further points, in addition to Fine’s, speaks against the modal
conception of essentiality. (1) Necessity and essentiality differs linguisti-
cally. One can speak of Socrates’ essence, but not of Socrates’ necessity.
However, one can speak of Socrates’ essential properties and Socrates’
necessary properties. The linguistic point is thus an argument against
equating essentiality with necessity. But it leaves open a wide range of
other possible relations between essentiality and necessity. (2) Necessity
is generally recognized to be monotonic, e.g. if the existence of singleton
{Socrates} necessitates the existence of Socrates, then the singleton will
also necessitate Socrates’ existence no matter which additional premises
are added. In contrast, explanation is generally recognized to be non-
monotonic, e.g. ‘I did not buy oranges because I forgot’ might be a
good explanation, but ‘I did not buy oranges because I forgot and a
democrat is president of the US’ is not. Other notions more or less
distinct from essentiality, such as grounding and causation, have also
been argued, based on there being exceptions, to be non-monotonic and
consequently not necessary. Grounding is also taken to be a type of ex-
planation, namely metaphysical explanation (e.g. the ball is coloured in
virtue of being red), and the examples in [17], [32] prima facie indicate
that grounding is non-monotonic.1 Similarly, some [25], [30] argue that
causation is non-monotonic, e.g. giving someone a lethal dose of poison
causes them to die, but giving someone a lethal dose of poison and the
antidote does not cause them to die. Essentiality, like explanation and
causation (and perhaps grounding), is non-monotonic, and thus distinct
from necessity which is monotonic. E.g. if a bird is a raven, and ravens
are essentially black, then the bird will be black; but if a bird is a raven,
and ravens are essentially black, and the bird is an albino, then the bird
will not be black.
As a result of Fine’s work (cf. also [14]), many authors have argued
that not every property that is necessary is also essential. I.e. it is
false that if something is necessary then it is essential. On this broadly
neo-Aristotelian view, essentiality is understood non-modally (cf. also
[5], [19], [31]). Despite of the vast recent literature defending non-modal
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conceptions of essentiality, there have been few attempts at a strict def-
inition of essence and essential properties. And usually no distinction
is made between essence and essential property. Both Fine [8], [9] and
Lowe [19] emphasize the role of real definition, and they say that the real
definition is the essence (cf. [31]). Or rather, essence is not the definition
as a proposition or linguistic entity, but that which the real definition
signifies. Lowe also defines it in terms of the locution ‘what it is to be’:
“if X is something of a kind K, then we may say that X’s general essence
is what it is to be a K [...]” [19, p. 35] Others emphasize more heavily
the aspect that essence is explanatory, e.g. deRosset: “the essence of a
thing is the totality of its features that are explanatorily basic.” [5, p.
266] I present my own definitions of essence and essential property on
page 69, and I am hoping that my paper will justify these definitions.
To place these definitions at the beginning of this paper would give the
reader the false impression that these definitions are to be found in the
current literature on non-modal essentiality already.
Neo-Aristotelians like Fine simply assume that if a property is essen-
tial then it is necessary. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. My
paper first and foremost engages with this recent (and vast) literature of
neo-Aristotelians defending a non-modal conception of essentiality. Al-
though my argument is not without relevance for those who, like Kripke
and Putnam, have a modal conception of essentiality, I will be assum-
ing throughout the paper a non-modal conception. In the first section
I will present several counterexamples to the claim that if a property is
essential then it is necessary. More precisely, I present counterexamples
where a property is essential to an object of a certain kind, but yet the
property is not possessed by that object. After briefly discussing four
minor objections in section II, I then in section III answer a major ob-
jection to my case. The major objection makes the distinction between
a thin or constitutive essence (viz. the real definition constituted by
the genus and differentia) and a thick or consequential essence (viz. the
derivative attributes, viz. propria, which follows from the real definition)
[9, pp. 56-61]. The possible objector admits that the exceptions hold for
the consequential essence, but then claims that the constitutive essence
does not admit of exceptions and that the constitutive essence is what
is properly referred to as the essence. I concede this objection, although
I argue that this distinction is better put as one between (1) the essence
as the substantial universal expressed by its real definition, which is nec-
essary, and (2) the essential properties that follow from the essence and
are non-substantial universals, which are not formally necessary.
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I Counterexamples
Surprisingly, there seem to be countless cases where we are inclined to
say that a property is essential, and yet that the property is not neces-
sary.2 Some of these examples have been around in the literature for a
long a time, some going all the way back to Aristotle [29]3, while others
have been discussed by Kripke, Lowe, and Mumford. Birds essentially
have the capability to fly, but penguins, ostriches, birds who has had
their wings clipped, etc. do not have the capability to fly [24, p. 272];
[29, pp. 75-79]. Tigers essentially have four legs, but there are tigers
missing one or more of their legs [13, pp. 119-120]; [21, p. 199]. Ravens
essentially are black, but there are albino ravens [20, p. 150, pp. 188-189
& pp. 209-212]; [24]. Birds essentially are feathered, but e.g. geese are
(brutally) plucked several times during their life, and disease can cause
loss of feathers (e.g. Psittacine beak and feather disease). Mammals
essentially give birth to live young, though male mammals do not, nor
prepubertal children, nor postmenopausal females or females otherwise
sterile. Mammals essentially have fur, but some mammals have very
little fur (e.g. humans, hippopotamuses, elephants, and rhinoceroses),
and some mammals completely lack hair (e.g. the Sphynx cat). Beer
essentially contains alcohol, but then there is non-alcoholic beer where
the alcohol has been removed through heating or reverse osmosis. Wa-
ter essentially melts at 0◦C, but heavy water melts at 3.81◦C. Water
essentially is H2O, but H3O and HO naturally occur in distilled water
through autoionization.4 There is insufficient place to defend each of
these counterexamples in detail. The counterexamples cover cases from
biology and chemistry, and seem to concur with our current best sci-
entific theories. Moreover, similar counterexamples should not be too
difficult to supply, in case the reader finds none of these convincing, as
the counterexamples exhibit two closely related generic structures:
I) A property (dispositional or categorical) is essential to a genus or
species, yet some instances of this genus or species do not have this
essential property.
II) A property (dispositional or categorical) is essential to a genus, yet
some species of this genus do not have this essential property.
Admittedly, my examples are exclusively drawn from biology and chem-
istry. Even if my examples are defendable, it might still hold for other
fields and sciences that if a property is essential then it is also necessary.
Take e.g. non-applied mathematics: it is true that one speaks about
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special cases in mathematics, e.g. that the equilateral is a special case of
triangle in that all its sides are equal. But even though the equilateral
is in this aspect distinct from all other triangles, this is not an aspect
that is essential to triangles (viz. that its sides are not all equal), and
thus special cases in mathematics do not show that essential properties
can be non-necessary. And on the other hand, it is easy to find cases of
essential and necessary properties in mathematics. Take Fine’s example
of Socrates and the singleton set {Socrates}. While it is not essential
(yet necessary) for Socrates that he is the sole member of {Socrates}, it
is essential and necessary for {Socrates} that it has Socrates as its sole
member.
Then there are some of the properties that have been much discussed
in the modal essentialist literature. E.g. being self-identical and being
distinct from everything else are necessary properties; however they are
also trivial properties [22, p. 20], and therefore arguably non-essential
properties. Less trivial are cases like Cicero being identical to Tully, or
even more cases like Hesperus being identical to Venus (or more precisely,
Hesperus being a phase of Venus). Perhaps some of these properties can
be argued to be both essential and necessary. E.g. Kripke’s thesis of
the necessity of origin; this is a controversial thesis in the literature (cf.
[22] for a recent discussion), and suffice it to say that if the thesis is
defendable, then this would be a case where a property (e.g. being the
son of Rabbi Myer and Dorothy) would be both essential and necessary
to an individual (viz. Kripke).
My suggestion is that the connection between essentiality and neces-
sity, such that essential properties are also necessary, cannot be a formal
property of essentiality. Instead it must be a material property, viz. that
the subject-matter determines whether essentiality will imply necessity
or not.
II Four Minor Objections
My counterexamples can be met by four objections, but I argue that
these ‘minor’ objections are unsatisfactory, and that most are unable to
deal with all of my counterexamples.
First, one might object for each of the essential properties featuring
in the counterexamples that they are not in fact essential properties.
E.g. that birds do not essentially fly, or that beer does not essentially
contain alcohol, or that heavy water is not water even though it is H2O,
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or that female fertile mammals essentially give birth to live young, etc.
It is certainly possible that some of my cases are not in fact essential
properties, but it is implausible that all are not. And such a strategy
would have to be on a case by case basis, but it is highly implausible that
a separate reason can be found for any possible such counterexample.
However, if the reason for denying that these are essential properties
is solely that they allow for counterexamples, then that is precisely the
point at issue. Some further argument must be offered by the objector.
The most plausible argument might claim that without the connection
to necessity, essentiality is simply inapplicable. More precisely, how is
one to separate an exception disproving an essential predication from an
exception which does not disprove an essential predication? In contrast,
given the thesis that if a property is essential then it is necessary, then
any exception falsifies the essential predication. In response one must
certainly value the simplicity resulting from this view, but one must
also remark that it is oversimplistic. It too easily falsifies well-proven
scientific theorems. E.g. a featherless bird will then falsify that birds
essentially are feathered.
Second, one might restrict essentiality to chemical elements and mi-
crophysical particles (or constituents at an even more fine-grained gran-
ularity). Thus one would eliminate at least most of the exceptions, if
not all. All other existents would be reducible to these fundamental ex-
istents. For instance Bird seems to subscribe to such a reductive view
(cf. also [6], [7] although Ellis is vulnerable to the objections concerning
water):
The Laws of nature will explain why—necessarily—there are
no members of chemical and microphysical kinds that lack
certain properties, why of necessity certain properties cluster
together in a partially or fully precise manner. [2, p. 211]
But this reductive approach has received much criticism and scepticism
(cf. [31, pp. 120-150] for an up-to-date presentation), and can be said
to be a minority position. The majority position is towards a more com-
monsensical and Aristotelian approach, where things of widely different
granularities, not least our normal-sized objects, have essential proper-
ties. Note that this view of Bird and Ellis is separate from Kripke’s and
Putnam’s view that the internal constitution of a thing is its essence,
because Bird and Ellis argues that normal-sized objects do not have
essences and essential properties. A more in-depth criticism of this re-
ductive view is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Third, one might restrict essentiality to infimae species like penguins
and ostriches, and deny essentiality to the higher genus like birds. The
argument for this restriction could parallel the argument for only al-
lowing maximally determinate universals or properties [1, pp. 117-118];
[11, p. 152]. Namely, it is because this particular is a penguin that it
is a bird, in parallel with the claim that it is because this particular is
scarlet that it is red. This objection would eliminate the second type
of counterexamples, because the essential properties of the species could
not then be in conflict with the essential properties of the genus, as
there would be no essential properties of the genus. However, the first
type of counterexamples would remain as potent as before. Ravens are
essentially black, and raven is an infima species, but there are albino
ravens.
Fourth, one might restrict essentiality to individuals, such that all
essences are individual essences viz. haecceities. This objection would
eliminate all my counterexamples. However, even though a few authors
have defended a minimal haecceitism [10], [22], [28], only Leibniz’s mon-
adology seems a case of extreme haecceitism where essentiality is re-
stricted to individuals (viz. the monads). Not only is the mere existence
of individual essences highly controversial. In addition, there are serious
objections against extreme haecceitism [22], e.g. it has the prima fa-
cie undesirable consequence that “not only could Napoleon have been a
poached egg, the world could have been qualitatively just as it actually is
but such that a poached egg and Napoleon swap their respective qualita-
tive roles.” [4] Further, the individual essence would be highly restricted
(perhaps to a this-ness and an origin). For instance Tabby the tiger can-
not have an individual essence of being quadrupedal, since Tabby could
lose a leg. The thesis that all essences are individual essences (i.e. ex-
treme haecceitism) thus admittedly eliminates all my counterexamples,
but the philosophical drawbacks of this thesis seem to far outweigh the
benefits.
III Major Objection: Essence as Real Definition
The major objection makes use of Fine’s distinction between a thin or
constitutive essence (viz. the real definition constituted by the genus
and differentia) and a thick or consequential essence (viz. the derivative
propria) [9, pp. 56-61]. The possible objector admits that the consequen-
tial essence admits of exceptions, but then claims that the constitutive
essence does not admit of exceptions and that the constitutive essence
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is what is properly referred to as the essence. There is a long tradition
for this view dating back to Aristotle’s view that the essence is what
the real definition signifies, and where the real definition is composed
of the genus and differentia, while the derivative propria do not signify
the essence (Topics I 8, 103b9-11). Fine himself stresses the connection
between essence and real definition [8], and he says that his “distinction
corresponds roughly to the traditional distinction between essence and
propria.” [9, p. 57]
Applying Fine’s distinction, I admit that an essence will hold nec-
essarily of an object – if a tiger ceases to be a feline, then ipso facto
it ceases to be. On the other hand, does it make sense to say that the
essence of tiger essentially belongs to the tiger? Such a predication is
redundant – it does not essentially have the essence, instead it simply
is its essence. Otherwise, there would loom an infinite regress, for it
could also be essential, that the essence holds essentially, and so on ad
infinitum. And besides, what would it mean to be the contrary, namely
to accidentally have the essence?
Fine’s own distinction focuses on the difference between the con-
stitutive essence (what I will simply call the essence), and the essential
properties that follows as a consequence from the essence. This is largely
a logical distinction focused on derivability. In the literature there is also
the ontological distinction, from Categories 2 (1a20-1b9), between sub-
stantial and non-substantial universals, viz. Strawson’s sortal universals
and characterizing universals [26], viz. Mulligan/Simons/Smith’s second
substances and non-substantial universals [23], viz. Lowe’s kinds and at-
tributes/properties [18]. For instance ‘Socrates is a man’ says what he
is (i.e. his essence), while ‘Socrates is white’ says how he is (i.e. that he
has a certain quality). Man is a substantial universal, White is a non-
substantial universal. To fall under a substantial universal is transitive,
such that from adding the premise ‘Man is an animal’ one can conclude
that ‘Socrates is an animal’ (this would be a mediate essence). How-
ever to fall under a non-substantial universal is intransitive, such that
from adding the premise ‘White is a colour’ one cannot conclude that
‘Socrates is a colour’. To mark this distinction I will refer to substantial
universals as essences, and to non-substantial universals as properties.
If one assumes that this is a categorical distinction, then nothing will
be both a substantial and a non-substantial universal; in other words
nothing will both be an essence and a property. The question then is
whether the differentia, which together with the genus constitutes the
essence, belongs to a substantial or a non-substantial universal? The
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answer is that the differentia belongs to a substantial universal, but the
essential properties which the differentia refers to are non-substantial
universals. For instance ‘Tawny-coloured and black-striped’ is part of
the differentia of tiger, is a differentiation of the substantial universal
Feline, and is itself part of a substantial universal (viz. tiger). This cor-
responds to the constitutive essence, and says what the tiger is. However
the essential properties of being tawny-coloured and being black-striped
are non-substantial universal. They say something about how the tiger
is, what kind of properties it has. One might call this the consequential
essence provided that one accepts that it is not a necessary consequence.
At this point I think all the elements of my definition of essence and
of essential property have been sufficiently presented, and thus I present
my definitions:
Essencedf : An essence of an object X is the substantial universal
expressed by its real definition.
Essential propertydf : An object X has a property P essentially
iff the property P is explanatory and non-trivial, and P follows
from the essence of X.
My definition of essence largely follows the definitions of Fine and Lowe
[8], [9], [19]. My definition of essential property incorporates some el-
ements from deRosset [5]. Both definitions are non-modal. Essence is
definitionally prior to essential property, since the definition of essential
property involves essence. The force of ‘follows from’ must be taken
as a conditional that is weaker than the material conditional, and as
somewhere in between logical consequence and causal consequence. The
requirement that an essential property be explanatory and non-trivial ex-
cludes trivial properties like being self-identical. The requirement that
an essential property of an object must follow from that very object’s
essence excludes the case of the existence of {Socrates} from being es-
sential to Socrates, since the existence of {Socrates} follows from the
essence of {Socrates} rather than from the essence of Socrates.
However, let us take a closer look at the connection between the
essence and the essential properties that follows from the essence. Re-
member, the objector grants the case that consequential essence does
not entail necessity.
Let us begin with the genus, which together with the differentia com-
poses the real definition, e.g. that the genus of tiger is Feline. I take it
to be uncontroversial that Tabby the tiger is necessarily a feline. How-
ever, it is not uncontroversial that Tabby the tiger necessarily is a tiger.
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Cladism, following its founder Willi Hennig, is the theory that a splitting
of a species (a speciation event) marks the beginning of two (or more)
new species and the ‘extinction’ of the original species. Cladism might
be a reason for denying that Tabby the tiger necessarily is a tiger (i.e.
Panthera tigris), since the species Tiger might at any point split into two
separate new species – and thus Tabby could (while retaining all intrinsic
properties) cease being a tiger and instead become a tiger-descendant.5
However, cladism would not preclude Tabby from necessarily being a
feline or a mammal, since Tabby would be a descendant of feline and
mammal (and belong to the clade of descendants from these) [15, pp.
50-62]. Briefly put, an essentialist and cladist like LaPorte would deny
that Tabby necessarily is a member of any species (viz. tiger), but he
would not deny that Tabby necessarily is a member of a kind (feline
or mammal). For simplicity ignoring cladism, one can say that Tabby
necessarily is a tiger. Then feline would be the immediate genus fea-
turing in the definition of tiger. Thus Tabby is also necessarily feline.
One can further say that Tabby is necessarily a mammal. Mammal is
here a mediate genus [9, pp. 61-62] of Tabby (i.e. a genus of the imme-
diate genus), illustrating that genus/species and constitutive essence is
transitive. To conclude, I take it that the genus is on its own sufficient
to yield necessary membership to a kind or sort, viz. immediately the
genus and mediately the genus of the genus etc. But genus on its own is
not sufficient to yield Kripke’s other cases of essentiality and necessity,
e.g. ‘Water is H2O’.
Prima facie, the differentia seems to give us this. Let us define
water as a chemical compound or molecule (i.e. the genus) of two parts
hydrogen to one part oxygen (i.e. the differentia). ‘Water is H2O’, or
more precisely ‘Water is essentially composed ofH2O’, then simply refers
to the differentia. Namely, water necessarily has H2O as differentia. So
far everything is good, and my counterexamples cannot object to this
being necessary (assuming that this is the correct definition of water).
However, a problem arises if one in addition says that water has the
property of being composed of, or reducible to, or identical with H2O.
At least if this is taken to imply that any sample of water will be H2O –
although it seems to be true that most samples of water are in large part
composed of H2O. If one interprets ‘Water is H2O’ strictly, then there
arise one of the counterexamples mentioned above. Water is essentially
H2O, but even purified water will not only contain H2O but also H3O
and HO (resulting from autoionization). In addition, normal drinking
water will also contain other ions, salts, molecules, etc. It is by no means
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necessary that any arbitrary molecule from a portion of water will be
H2O. But I think it is correct to say that water is essentially composed
of H2O.
Similar cases abound in biology. From these cases it is evident that
while an animal cannot lose its genus or differentia and yet continue
existing, it can lose some of its essential attributes and yet continue
existing. Perhaps, as with the case of water, this even includes the
essential properties featuring in the differentia. There is a multitude of
ways in which the differentia of a species may be conceptualized. One
might think that the differentia should be a single constitutive essential
property, and that all consequential essential properties are derivative
from this single constitutive essential property. Already Aristotle seems
to have realized that this is impossible, viz. that more than a single
essential property is needed in order to explain all consequential essential
properties. For instance for fish there is no single attribute which can
count as the differentia [3, pp. 333ff.]. Their mode of locomotion (viz.
swimmers) explains some consequential essential properties; their mode
of reproduction explains others; and their source of nutrition explains
yet others. As a result Aristotle introduced the concept of bios, which is
an integration of all these various properties [16]. A similar view is found
in the contemporary literature; e.g. DeRosset [5] thinks that essence is
a totality of the explanatory basic properties, and this seems similar to
Aristotle’s concept of bios.
An approximation to this would be the linguistic practice common
in dictionaries of ‘defining’ by giving a list of properties. E.g. one can
‘define’ tiger as a large, carnivorous, tawny-coloured and black-striped
feline. But a newly born tiger is not large, and an albino-tiger is not
tawny-coloured and black-striped. There is no non-carnivorous tiger, but
lion is also a carnivorous feline. It might be thought that ‘descendent of
Panthera’ would work as differentia, but this is merely a restatement of
the genus and could not differentiate the tiger from the lion. Another
option is to give the differentia as ‘disposed to interbreed with other
tigers’, however there are fertile hybrids of tigers and lions [12, pp. 104-
114]. Finally, one might suggest that the differentia is ‘having genetic
makeup x’, however the genetic makeup differs considerably among the
individuals of a species.6 There simply are no necessary and sufficient
criteria for biological species. In practice the biologist favours the use of
a type specimen, which is an arbitrarily chosen individual to which all
other members of the species bears a relation of similarity or sameness
(for further discussion of this topic [12, pp. 104-114]. To sum up, a
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single or a list of essential properties will not do as a real definition of
the essence as there will be exceptions.
This discussion indicates that the constitutive essence on its own has
a more limited application and interest than what much recent literature
has taken it to have. One could say what the essence of e.g. a tiger
is, by giving the differentia and the genus, and one can also say what
its mediate essence is (e.g. mammal). One could also argue that the
essence gives its identity and persistence conditions, viz. it is partly
identified in virtue of this essence and it only persists provided it retains
this essence. And this will be necessary, and as a consequence also
monotonic. However, one cannot say that it will necessarily have any
single property – for this one would have to know more than the essence.
For instance, to know that it has the attribute of being striped one would
have to add that it is not an albino.
Of course, one does not have to take the constitutive essence on its
own. One can add the consequential essence, or as I prefer to put it, one
can add the essential properties. But these will not hold by necessity
solely because they are essential. There is nothing in the essence, no
formal trait, which ensures necessity for the essential properties. But
through identification of the essential properties one can not only say
what qualities a thing has, but one can further say why it has these
qualities (viz. as a consequence of a certain essence).
IV Conclusion
In this paper I have, based upon several prima facie counterexamples,
argued that a property can hold by essentiality and at the same time
not hold by necessity. Further, I have applied this point to Fine’s dis-
tinction between the essence (viz. constitutive essence) and the essential
properties (viz. consequential essence).
An essence hold necessarily of an object – if a tiger ceases to be a
feline, then ipso facto it ceases to be. But, on pain of a regress, the
essence will not hold essentially.
Essential properties, in contrast, are not part of the essence, but
caused by and explained by reference to the essence. These properties
could, as properties, also be held accidentally. Hence it is informative
to say that they are in a certain case essential, i.e. a consequence of
an essence. Taken in this way, essential properties may or may not be
necessary.7
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Notes
1 Even though there is a close affinity between essence and grounding in recent
neo-Aristotelian literature, my counterexamples differ greatly from the coun-
terexamples in the literature against the thesis that grounding is necessary. E.g.
the fact that Xanthippe became a widow is grounded in the fact that Socrates
died. But Xanthippe could have married someone else. First, the relata for the
counterexamples on grounding are all apparently facts, and there is no straight-
forward translation into talks about essences and essential properties. Second,
the grounding-counterexamples say either that further facts must be added if
the ground is to necessitate the grounded (e.g. the fact that Xanthippe was
Socrates’ wife), or that further facts may obtain in other possible worlds such
that the grounded fact would not obtain [17, p. 165]. The first type of grounding-
counterexamples is vulnerable to the objection that it is then only a partial
ground, while the full ground would include the added fact and be necessary [32,
p. 478]. The second type is vulnerable to the objection that its possible world
is too distinct from the actual world. My counterexamples are not vulnerable to
parallel objections, because no addition of extra facts seems to make the essential
properties necessary, and because my counterexamples concern the actual world
(or one very close to it).
2 An anonymous reviewer suggested to me that what I call ‘essential properties’ are
what Kripke calls ‘important properties’, which “need not be essential” [13, p.
77]. Kripke’s example is that it is an important property of Aristotle that he wrote
his philosophical works, but Aristotle could instead have had a different career
(say as a doctor). In that case there would be a mere terminological difference
between (1) important properties that need not be modally essential, and (2)
essential properties that need not be necessary. Kripke’s term ‘important’ leads
to the question, important for whom? This subjective implication sits poorly
with the examples from biology and chemistry, and therefore I prefer my own
terminology (although I do not think the terminology makes for too much of a
difference). Besides, the recent non-modal essentialist literature does not make
use of Kripke’s notion of important properties either, and thus it does not impact
my subsequent argumentation.
3 Ellis also attributes such cases to Aristotle [7, p. 10 & p. 14], but he replies
that ”modern essentialists would not accept such looseness” [7, p.14]. In order
to avoid this looseness, viz. the view that essentiality does not imply necessity,
Ellis is willing to restrict essences to the, in his view, most basic substances such
as atoms, molecules, and subatomic particles. I trust that this is too heavy a
price to pay for most modern essentialists.
4 An anonymous reviewer suggested to me that some of these cases build upon
vagueness. E.g. featherless and furless are similar to baldness. E.g. Non-alcoholic
beer is typically allowed to contain up to 0,5% alcohol. E.g. how high a propor-
tion of H2O is sufficient for a liquid to be water? However, in all these cases there
is a real possibility to be absolutely featherless, furless, to contain no alcohol, and
to contain solely H3O and HO, and in those cases vagueness is a non-issue.
5 The picture is a bit more complex, since the speciation event where one species
is split into two new species is gradual. There is no exact moment where this
speciation event takes place; rather it is a gradual process taking place over a
long time and without any clear boundaries.
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6 In fact, Ellis [6, p. 21] draws from this the, to me, absurd conclusion that e.g.
humans are not of a single kind with a single essence.
7 Thanks to Ludger Jansen, Niels Grewe, Georg Fu¨llen, and the two anonymous
reviewers of this journal, for invaluable comments and criticism.
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